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THE MORE COOPERATION, THE MORE COMPETITION? 
A COURNOT ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS OF ELECTRIC MARKET COUPLING 
 
Abstract:  If spot markets for electric power decide to cooperate and eliminate barriers between 
them, what will happen to competition and prices in those markets?  And who will benefit?   In the 
case of the Belgian and Dutch markets, market coupling would permit more efficient use of inter-
country transmission by counting only net flows against transmission limits, by improving access 
to the Belgian market, and by eliminating the mismatch in timing between interface auctions and 
the energy spot market.   A Cournot market model that accounts for the region’s transmission pric-
ing rules and limitations is used to simulate market outcomes with and without market coupling, 
accounting for the first two of these three impacts of coupling.   The result would be an improve-
ment in social surplus on the order of 10
8
 €/year, unless market coupling encourages the largest 
producer in the region to switch from a price-taking strategy in Belgium to a Cournot strategy due 
to a perceived diminishment of the threat of regulatory intervention.  Whether market coupling 
would benefit Dutch consumers also depends on the behavior of this company.  The results illus-
trate how large-scale oligopoly models can be useful for assessing market integration. 
Keywords:  Electric power, Electric transmission, Liberalization, Oligopoly, Complementarity 
models, Computational models, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Market Coupling 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In response to European Union directives on electricity market liberalization, physical and 
institutional linkages between markets in different European countries are being expanded.   These 
changes will particularly affect the Dutch market because of its relatively high dependence upon 
imports (amounting to about 20% of its electric load, excluding self-supply by industry).  The price 
spikes that occasionally occur on the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX), the Dutch spot market, 
reflect this dependence.  In August of 2002, for instance, a maintenance outage on one of the three 
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Dutch-German interconnectors (Maasbracht – Rommerskirchen) caused a significant rise in prices 
on the APX.  In June of 2001, high prices on the APX were blamed on the outage of two reactors in 
Belgium, which decreased Belgian production by almost 2000 MW, along with a reduction of 300-
400 MW for the interconnector capacity between Belgium and France.   These examples illustrate 
how changes in import capability and generator availability in other countries can affect the Dutch 
market.  Other factors in neighboring countries, such as market concentration, market regulation, 
and environmental policy, can also have an impact. 
However, stronger market linkages are generally viewed as being economic beneficial for 
several reasons.  These include: granting access to lower cost imports, enhancing export opportuni-
ties for producers, and, in the long run, decreasing the amount of spare generation capacity (“re-
serves”) required to maintain a given level of reliability.  Further, closer linkages can dilute local 
market power (Market Surveillance Committee, 2002).  Of course, the benefits of linking markets 
are not uniformly distributed; for instance, consumers in regions that export more power may suffer 
price increases.  Policy makers are keenly interested in distributional questions; we demonstrate a 
method for quantifying both the total benefits of market coupling and their distribution.    
Proposals have been discussed recently for coupling the Dutch power markets with the 
neighboring German and Belgian markets (EuroPEX, 1993; Giesbertz et al., 2004).  The first goal 
of this paper is to quantify the short-run production and allocation efficiency benefits of such mar-
ket coupling, along with the distribution of these benefits among market parties.  Because the 
Dutch-Belgian proposal has been seriously considered by governments and market parties in-
volved, while the Dutch-Germany proposal is preliminary (Giesbertz et al., 2004), we focus on the 
former. “Market coupling” in the Dutch-Belgian case would comprise three basic changes: greater 
access by foreign suppliers to the Belgian market (as market coupling would require the develop-
 3
ment of a Belgian spot market); counting only net flows against transmission limits (rather than 
constraining gross transactions in each direction); and simultaneous rather than sequential clearing 
of transmission and energy markets.  The first two changes are the focus of this paper.    
It turns out that the issue of producer market power and how it is exercised is key to the 
conclusions of this analysis; differing assumptions change the total benefit and its distribution.  
Consequently, any analysis of the proposal must account for strategic behavior.  A second goal of 
this paper is to illustrate how a large-scale (thousands of variables) model of oligopolistic competi-
tion in transmission-constrained markets can help evaluate the structure and design of electricity 
markets.   Such models are increasingly useful in energy policy analysis (Smeers, 1997).   The 
model used is COMPETES (COmpetition and Market Power in Electric Transmission and Energy 
Simulator; Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004; Hobbs et al., 2004).  The model covers the northwestern 
European electricity markets (the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany).  It can simulate 
strategic behavior by generators while representing how transmission system operators (TSOs) set 
prices for the transmission services they provide.    
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, the market coupling proposal for the 
Dutch-Belgian markets is described.   Then, in Section 3, an overview of the oligopoly simulation 
model and its adaptation for this case study is given; a full mathematical development is available 
elsewhere (Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004).   Data assumptions are also summarized in that section.   
Section 4 presents the results of the analysis.   Sensitivity analyses are also undertaken concerning 
the behavior of the large generator Electrabel in its home market (Cournot or, as a result of per-
ceived regulatory threats, price-taking).  Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
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2.   THE BENELUX MARKET AND PROPOSALS FOR MARKET COORDINATION 
Electricity trade in the Benelux Market 
Compared to its neighbors, power is relatively expensive in Belgium and the Netherlands.   
This is because more than half of the Dutch generating capacity and about one-quarter of Belgian 
capacity is natural gas-fired, whose marginal cost exceeds that of nuclear and coal plants, the 
dominant fuels in France and Germany, respectively (Newbery et al., 2003).   Transmission limits 
restrict imports from these cheaper sources.  From Germany, 2200 MW can be exported to the 
Netherlands, while from France, approximately 1800 MW can be transmitted to Belgium (ibid.).   
These transmission limits are small compared to the 35,500 MW of generation capacity (including 
about 7,000 MW of distributed or “local” generation) in Belgium and the Netherlands.  As a result, 
the interconnectors from France to Belgium and from Germany to the Netherlands are congested 
approximately 90% of the time (Harris et al., 2003).  
However, there is also the possibility of beneficial power trade between Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  This is because their demand distributions do not perfectly coincide and they have 
different fuel mixes.   Of the 15,500 MW of capacity in Belgium, the following percentages are 
fueled by gas, oil, coal, nuclear, and other, respectively: 23%, 16%, 7%, 37%, and 17%.  For the 
central generation capacity of 14,000 MW in the Netherlands, the respective percentages are in-
stead 56%, 24%, 1%, 3%, and 16%.   Transmission between the two countries is limited to ap-
proximately 1150 MW.  Presently, it is fully used approximately one-third of the time in each di-
rection (Harris et al., 2003), although the prices paid for capacity are negligible (exceeding 1 
€/MWh only 1% of the time for the day-ahead market in 2002; Newbery et al., 2003).   It should be 
noted that it is possible for interconnection to be considered “congested” in both directions at once, 
as under the present allocation scheme, flows in opposite directions are not considered to cancel 
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each other out.   Instead, the gross sales in each direction are constrained separately.  The analysis 
later in this paper indicates that this “no netting” policy is a significant source of inefficiency be-
cause it restrains the ability of producers to compete in each others’ markets.
1
   
Such limits on competition are of concern because the Dutch and, especially, Belgian elec-
tricity markets are concentrated.   Table 1 shows the distribution of capacity among the four major 
generating companies in the Benelux region, along with ownership distributions for France and 
Germany, the major sources of imports.
2
   Notable is Electrabel’s dominance of the Belgian market.   
If all of northwest Europe is considered (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany), the Hirsch-
man-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is approximately 1800, indicating that the region’s market is only 
moderately concentrated.  However, the HHI is misleading when applied to electricity because 
transmission constraints isolate markets, greatly increasing effective concentration. 
Presently, transmission capacity between the Netherlands and its neighbors (Germany and 
Belgium) is divided into three interfaces, and is sold in a series of auctions with various restrictions.  
Meanwhile, French-Belgian interface capacity is administratively allocated because of fears that 
one player (Electricité de France) would dominate any auction.   Two of the Dutch interfaces are 
between the Dutch transmission system operator (TenneT) and the two major TSOs in northwest-
ern Germany, with an aggregate capacity in the year 2000 of approximately 2200 MW in each di-
rection (varying by season).  The other Dutch interface is between TenneT and Elia, the Belgian 
TSO, and consists of 1150 MW in each direction.  Some of this capacity (about 900 MW in 2000) 
is tied up in long-term contracts from the pre-liberalised era with German and French energy com-
panies.  The rest of the interface capacity is sold in a series of yearly, monthly, and daily auctions.  
The auctions for interconnectors with the Netherlands are run by TenneT’s subsidiary TSO-
                                                 
1
This policy also applies to the Dutch-German interconnections.  Hobbs et al. (2004) consider the impact of allowing 
netting on all the interfaces between the Netherlands and its neighbors. 
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Auction.  From the beginning of the auction system, approximately one-third of the capacity has 
been allocated through the yearly auction, and another third through the monthly auction. Some of 
the remaining third is reserved for TenneT’s system-balancing obligations to other European TSOs, 
and the rest is available for the daily auction.  Yearly and monthly contracted capacity not nomi-
nated day-ahead is then released for sale in the daily auction (“use it or lose it”).   Interface capacity 
prices are set by the lowest accepted bid in each auction after supply and demand curves for each 
interface are constructed from the submitted bids.   The daily auction closes before day-ahead 
prices are posted on the APX and the German power exchange EEX. 
Several other restrictions are applied to the transmission market.  In attempt to prevent mar-
ket dominance, no single party (generator or trader) can control more than 400 MW of import ca-
pacity to the Netherlands, summed across all interfaces.  Also, TenneT limits total imports to the 
Netherlands by all parties to 3350 MW or slightly more, depending on system conditions.  The 
individual interface limits, along with the aggregate 3350 MW limit, are set to ensure that real and 
reactive power flows through the region’s transmission lines, transformers, and other components 
would not violate thermal limits (overheating), voltage constraints, and system stability require-
ments (the ability to recover from disturbances) under a variety of spatial patterns of supply and 
demand, even if any of a number of significant “contingencies” (equipment outages) occur (Hau-
brich et al., 2001).   These limits are chosen conservatively, in part because the auctions are de-
signed as if power flows can be routed along a single path, rather than following all parallel paths 
consistent with Kirchhoff’s laws.  For instance, a trader exporting from France to the Netherlands 
can either purchase interconnector capacity through Belgium, or through Germany; Kirchhoff’s 
laws, however, imply that actual power flows will be split between these and other parallel paths.  
As a result of this conservatism, flows through the components are rarely close to their limits, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
2
 Only for the Netherlands is distributed generation taken into account, as it is a large share of total production.  
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interregional energy transfers are usually less than what is physically possible.
3
   
This system of simplified transmission auctions separated from energy markets has been 
criticized as presenting a barrier to efficient trade (Barale, 2003; Boucher and Smeers, 2002; Knops 
et al., 2001; Perez-Arriaga, 2002).  Thus, various reform proposals have been made.  Critics cite the 
following inefficiencies: the path-based accounting system for selling interfaces does not match the 
physical reality; the resulting conservatism restricts trade, as does the no-netting policy; and sepa-
rate and temporally mismatched energy and transmission auctions hamper arbitrage between the 
markets.  Not helping matters is that transparent and liquid spot markets do not exist in all coun-
tries; of special interest to us is the lack of such a market in Belgium.
4
    
Proposed market coupling for the Benelux region 
There have been two major proposals for improving the efficiency of electricity trade between Bel-
gium and the Netherlands (Harris et al., 2003).   The first, which was offered by Elia and TenneT in 
June 2001,
5
 would create a single spot market covering the two countries, with a single day-ahead 
price.   There would be no charge for use of the cross-border interconnector capacity.  If day-ahead 
schedules of power sales would violate transmission constraints between or within the two coun-
tries, TenneT and Elia would issue instructions to generators to adjust their dispatch to clear the 
congestion.  This procedure would be similar to the constrained-on/constrained-off payment system 
of the old England-Wales pool system.  
The second proposal  (Harris et al., 2003) would couple the markets by coordinating spot 
markets.  The APX is proposed to evolve into two spot markets, one per country.  The APX would 
                                                 
3 Haubrich et al. (2001) detail the conservative nature of the interface constraints.  Boucher and Smeers (2002) cri-
tique the inefficiencies that result from simplifying transmission constraints into a few between-country interface 
constraints.  The order of magnitude of the conservatism can be appreciated by noting that the sum of the individual 
power line capacities into the Netherlands is 11,600 megavolt-amperes.   However, even if efficiently managed, not 
all of this can be used for power transfer because of Kirchhoff’s laws and the need to accommodate reactive power. 
4 A small real-time market is run in Belgium so that market parties can correct imbalances in their scheduled power 
sales, and Electrabel does buy small amounts of power on a spot basis. 
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then arbitrage between the two markets, selling power from one to another if prices differed.  
Should transmission limits prevent complete arbitraging of the two markets, the difference between 
their prices would reflect the shadow price of the binding constraint.   There would be no day-
ahead sale of interconnector capacity, and the TSOs would retain the resulting economic rents from 
any day-ahead transfers between the countries.  Some interconnector capacity might still be re-
served for longer term contracts, but we do not consider this in our analysis below, where we in-
stead assume that all interconnector capacity will be available for coupling the day-ahead markets.   
The second proposal is similar in spirit to that of the Nordpool market splitting system in 
Scandinavia (Glachant and Finon, 2003; Knops et al., 2001) and locational marginal pricing as 
widely used in the U.S. (Hogan, 1992); in both, TSOs perform an arbitraging function, and spatial 
price differences equal the marginal cost of transmission between locations.   Harris et al. (2003) 
considered this proposed reform, along with the single market proposal, and recommended the 
former, at least as an initial step, because of the potential for transmission congestion.  Their con-
cern was with the potential for gaming in the single market proposal when congestion between 
Belgium and the Netherlands necessitates redispatch in real-time.
6
  For this reason, policy makers 
have focused on the second proposal, and so do we in this paper.  Harris et al. (2003) also recom-
mended that Electrabel divest some of its Belgian generating capacity to prevent possible market 
power problems that could arise because the Belgian spot market might otherwise be illiquid. 
There are three important differences between the current market situation in the Benelux 
countries and this market coupling proposal.  One is that market coupling will eliminate the diffi-
                                                                                                                                                              
5 www.tennet.nl/nieuws/archief/samenwerking_met_belgische_tso.asp 
6
 The best known of these games is the “dec” game in which a generator on the exporting side of a transmission 
constraint overschedules day-ahead, receiving the (relatively high) single market price, and then is redispatched in 
real time by buying its power back at (a usually lower) real-time price.  On net, it is paid to do nothing.  Elsewhere, 
for example, the dec game has been costing California millions of dollars per month in 2003 and 2004 because its 
zonal market design does not recognize certain transmission constraints within its southern zone (Sheffrin, 2004). 
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culties that Dutch market participants (claim to) face when attempting to sell electricity into the 
Belgian market.  Although the Belgian power market is nominally open to outside purveyors, in 
fact it has been very difficult for non-Belgian providers to secure customers.   Personal communi-
cations with market participants indicate that it is difficult for large Belgian customers to even re-
ceive bids from generators other than Electrabel.  Reasons cited include uncertainties about Bel-
gian-Dutch transmission availability (changes in which could cut sales with little warning), and the 
absence of a liquid balancing market in Belgium (meaning that out of country suppliers cannot be 
confident that they can purchase balancing power at competitive prices).   These difficulties can be 
interpreted as high transaction costs.   We model them as constraints on the ability of generating 
firms and traders other than Electrabel to export from the Netherlands to Belgium. 
A second important difference concerns “netting” of transmission capacity between Bel-
gium and the Netherlands.  From an electrical point of view, energy flows in a transmission system 
can be constrained by thermal limits, stability considerations, voltage bounds, and other technical 
constraints (Schweppe et al., 1988).  In most situations these are translated into limits on the net 
energy flow through particular transmission system components or collections of components.   
Thus, if the limit between regions A and B is 1000 MW, then a sale of 500 MW from A to B means 
that up to 1500 MW can be sold by B to A.  Because the sale from A to B relieves congestion, a 
TSO who “nets” flows would pay it a per MWh amount equal to the transmission price paid by the 
B to A sale.  However, such netting of flows is not considered in the transmission capacity auctions 
between the Netherlands and its neighbors.  Instead, capacity in each direction is sold separately 
without regard to the additional capacity made possible by counterflows; in the case of our simple 
example, sales from B to A could not exceed 1000 MW no matter how much is sold from A to B.  
In general, such “no netting” provisions restrict the ability of competitors from other countries to 
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enter a market, increasing effective concentration and prices (Hobbs et al., 2004).  In order to en-
hance transmission access, EU Electricity Regulation 1228/2003 requires that  
“(t)ransmission system operators shall, as far as technically possible, net the capac-
ity requirements of any power flows in opposite direction over the congested inter-
connection line in order to use this line to its maximum capacity.”
7
 
 
The third important difference is the mismatch of timing between transmission capacity 
auctions and the APX.  In particular, bids for the auction are submitted before energy prices are 
posted on the APX, and there are no organized resale markets for transmission capacity.  Conse-
quently, the price of a given interface may deviate significantly from price differences between the 
two countries.  Because there is no organized Belgian spot market, this potential discrepancy is not 
easy to verify for the Belgian-Dutch interface.  However, it is readily observed between the EEX 
and APX, whose price differences are poorly correlated with daily German-Dutch interface prices 
(Haubrich et al., 2001).
8
   The potential for inefficient arbitrage stemming from the divergence of 
daily interface prices from price differences between countries is proposed to be eliminated by 
market coupling, since the APX would efficiently arbitrage the Belgian and Dutch spot markets, 
based on supply and demand bids submitted to each.  Generators and traders would not have to 
submit separate transmission bids, and would not have to guess at spot prices when submitting such 
bids.  
We consider the first two of the above three changes that would result from implementation 
of coupling of the Belgian and Dutch power markets.   The potential effects of giving German and 
Dutch market players access to the Belgian market and the elimination of the “no netting” restric-
                                                 
7
 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_176/l_17620030715en00010010.pdf , Article 6, Sub 5. 
8  However, longer term averages are broadly consistent (Newbery and McDaniel, 2003).  Price inconsistencies do 
not necessarily signal inefficiencies.  If flows on an interface only affect that interface and no other transmission 
facility, then if the spot energy price is higher at the receiving end, full use of the interface in that direction is all that 
is required for efficiency. The price of the interface does not have to be equal to the spot market price differences.  
Inefficiencies are obvious if instead there are spot market price differences, but the interface is not fully used in the 
correct direction.  Inefficiencies can also occur if there are interactions with other transmission facilities. 
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tion is assessed using the oligopolistic power market model COMPETES, summarized in the next 
section.  COMPETES can represent a variety of systems of transmission pricing, including fixed 
transmission tariffs, congestion-based pricing of physical transmission, and auctioning of interface 
capacity between countries.   In this paper, we take advantage of that flexibility to represent how 
Belgian market access and flow netting between the Netherlands and Belgium would alter the abil-
ity of power generators to compete in different markets.  Changes in surpluses earned by various 
market parties are described, as are changes in economic efficiency (as gauged by total surplus).
9
 
3. MARKET SIMULATION METHOD 
Many models for simulating oligopolistic power markets have been proposed (see reviews 
by Daxhelet and Smeers, 2001; Day et al., 2002; and Ventosa et al., 2004).   For our problem, it is 
desirable that such a model have the following characteristics.   One is computational convenience.  
A second is the ability to represent either “bilateral” competition among producers who compete to 
sell power to ultimate consumers while purchasing transmission services from a TSO (Figure 1), or 
“pool”-type competition in which producers sell to their local spot market, and either the TSO or a 
trader/arbitrager transfers power between markets.   
A third desirable characteristic is that strategic interaction between energy producers is 
based on accepted game-theoretic frameworks.  Here, we adopt a Cournot-Nash approach.  Other 
approaches are Petrov et al., 2003).  However, the Cournot approach has two advantages.  One is 
descriptive in nature: Bushnell et al. (2004) argue that it is the most relevant and empirically de-
scriptive game-theoretic concept for markets in which bilateral contracts are the dominant form of 
exchange.   (This is the situation in the Benelux countries, as only about 15% of Dutch power is 
                                                 
9
Because COMPETES is an equilibrium model that simultaneously solves for transmission and energy prices, disequi-
libria between transmission and energy prices resulting from mismatches in market timing cannot be considered by this 
approach.  The possible benefit of efficient arbitrage between generation and transmission markets was considered by 
Audouin et al. (2002) for all of Europe, but under an assumption of price-taking behavior by generators. 
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exchanged in the APX, and there is no formal spot market in Belgium.)   Another advantage is a 
practical one: pure strategy equilibria for transmission-constrained markets often do not exist for 
supply function games (e.g., Berry et al., 1999), and even if they exist, they are difficult to calcu-
late.   
 The fourth desired characteristic is that the model should represent the characteristics of 
interest of the transmission pricing systems, and how they impact competition in submarkets.  
Among Cournot models, there are two basic approaches to modeling transmission (Hobbs and 
Helman, 2004).  One is to imbed the first-order conditions that the TSO uses to determine transmis-
sion prices as constraints in each producer’s optimization problem (e.g., Oren, 1997; Cardell et al., 
1997; Hobbs et al., 2000; Cunningham et al., 2002; Neuhoff, 2003b).   Thus, each producer is a 
Stackelberg leader with respect to the transmission pricing system, each anticipating how its pro-
duction and sales decisions affect transmission prices.
10
  Inserting the TSO’s first-order conditions 
in each producer’s model makes them difficult to solve, and it is not possible to prove, for the gen-
eral case, existence or uniqueness of pure strategy equilibria among producers.
11
    
The other approach for including transmission in Cournot models is to instead assume that 
producers are price-takers (Bertrand) with respect to the price of transmission charged by the TSO.   
This is the approach taken by COMPETES, among other models (e.g.,Wei and Smeers, 1999).  Its 
advantage is that the resulting equilibrium problem among Cournot producers takes the form of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
10 In the most general case, these first-order conditions take the form of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions that 
are described by the following complementarity problem: x > 0, f(x) < 0, x
T
f(x) = 0, where x is a vector of decision 
variables and f(x) is a vector of the same length of functions (e.g., marginal benefit minus marginal cost).   
11
 This is because the constraints in each producer’s problem define a nonconvex feasible region, implying that local 
optima may not be globally optimal.   This type of optimization model is termed a mathematical program with equi-
librium constraints (MPEC); an equilibrium problem involving several MPECs is called an equilibrium problem with 
equilibrium constraints (EPEC) (Daxhelet and Smeers, 2001).  A simple example of the non-existence of a pure 
strategy equilibrium for the type of Cournot EPEC described here is given in Hobbs and Helman (2004). The 
mathematics of these problems is an active area of research.  
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complementarity problem, defined by concatenating the first-order conditions for each market par-
ticipant together with market clearing conditions (Hobbs, 2000; Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004).  For 
such problems, existence and uniqueness results are readily obtained (Metzler et al., 2003), and 
efficient software exists to compute solutions (e.g., PATH: Dirkse and Ferris, 1995). 
COMPETES has these desired characteristics.  The model is readily solved by complemen-
tarity software.  Producers compete à la Cournot with each other to sell power bilaterally to con-
sumers.   Transmission constraints are explicitly included, with producers behaving as price takers 
relative to the price of transmission.
12
   COMPETES can represent auctions for path-based trans-
mission interfaces (as between Netherlands and its neighboring countries), as well as efficient pric-
ing of transmission constraints in linearized networks satisfying Kirchhoff’s laws.  It is also possi-
ble to include traders who efficiently arbitrage different markets, so that the price difference be-
tween markets equals the cost of transmission.   Metzler et al. (2003) prove that for models with 
COMPETES’ general formulation that a bilateral Cournot market with such arbitrage yields the 
same profits and prices as a Cournot “pool”-type model.
13
   We take advantage of that equivalence 
to simulate the market coupling proposal.  The major compromise made in adopting COMPETES 
is that the assumption of price-taking by producers with respect to transmission prices may not be 
viewed as being as realistic as the Stackelberg assumption described previously.
14
     
Model Structure 
The structure of the COMPETES model is as follows (for details, see Hobbs and Rijkers, 
                                                 
12
COMPETES also has the option of a more general type of game in which each producer holds a prior set of conjec-
tures concerning how its rivals will alter their outputs in response to marginal price deviations from the equilibrium; 
this “conjectured supply function” approach is similar to a conjectural variations model (Day et al., 2002).  Each 
producers can also hold similar conjectures regarding how transmission prices will change if it shifts its output or 
sales marginally from the equilibrium (Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004).  These generalizations are not considered here. 
13
This generalized a similar result for competitive transmission-constrained models (Boucher and Smeers, 2001). 
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Neuhoff (2003a), in contrast, has assumed a Stackelberg strategy in studying the effects of market coupling; we 
contrast his approach and results with ours in Section 4, infra..  
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2004).   The mathematical problem defining the market equilibrium in each period of time is de-
fined as the simultaneous satisfaction of the three following sets of conditions: 
1. KKT optimality conditions for each producer.   Each producer maximizes revenue from 
sales in each market minus (a) the costs of generation from each power plant it owns and (b) the 
cost of transmitting power, including the expense of any required interface capacity in the path-
based system and transmission capacity in the linearized network flow.   In this maximization, sales 
by other producers and any arbitrage are treated as exogenous (Cournot), as are transmission prices 
from the TSO (Bertrand).  Price at each node is assumed to follow an affine demand curve.  Con-
straints include capacity for each generation plant, and an energy balance (total sales = total genera-
tion).   In the case of path-based transmission pricing, the generator buys the least costly combina-
tion of interfaces in order to transmit its power to consumers; however, Kirchhoff’s laws imply that 
there is no such choice available for the full network model, as flows will be distributed among the 
lines in conformance with those laws.
15
  If access to some markets is difficult or not possible (as for 
foreign producers in Belgium), the corresponding sales variables can simply be omitted from the 
model.   If there are limits upon the amount of transmission interface a producer can buy (for in-
stance, the present 400 MW limit per producer between the Netherlands and Belgium), then this is 
imposed as an explicit constraint in the producer model. 
2. KKT optimality conditions for the arbitrager.  The arbitrager maximizes its profit from buy-
ing power at one location, paying TSO fees to transmit the power to another location, and then sell-
ing it there.   The arbitrager views all prices as exogenous.  The only constraint is that its total pur-
chases must equal total sales.   The arbitrager can also choose the optimal transmission paths for its 
flows if path-based pricing is used.  If access is not possible for some markets, the relevant sales 
 15 
and purchase variables are omitted. 
3. Market clearing conditions for transmission.   The precise formulation depends on how 
transmission is priced.   In this application, flows between countries are priced based on the path-
based interface system; in addition, a linearized full network model is also imposed to ensure that 
no flows on individual transmission lines exceed their limits.  For the path-based system, a com-
plementarity condition states that the price for an interface can only be positive if the quantity de-
manded of that interface equals its capacity.   By appropriate definition of coefficients, one can 
represent either the situation of “no netting” or “netting” of flows.  For the “no netting” case, non-
negative flow variables are defined for each direction in the interface, and quantity demanded for 
interface capacity is separately tallied for each direction, based upon the path choices of producers 
and the arbitrager.  For the “netting” case, quantity demanded for an interface in a given direction 
equals the flow in one direction minus the flow in the other.  Flows that relieve congestion will be 
paid (by the TSO) the transmission price that flows in the other direction must pay (to the TSO).  
For the full network model, equations define the price for transmitting from one location to another 
as equaling the sum of the prices of each transmission capacity constraint, weighted by the relevant 
power transmission distribution factors (PTDFs).
16
  
The resulting equilibrium problem should have the same number of variables as condi-
tions.
17
   In this application of COMPETES, the model has approximately 1800 variables and an 
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 As a consequence, with efficient pricing of transmission in the full network model, no profitable arbitrage will be 
possible among transmission rights.  For instance, the price of transmission from A to B will be the same as the sum 
of the transmission price from A to C and then C to B. 
16 PTDFs in linearized electrical networks describe the incremental flow on each transmission element resulting from 
a unit injection at one location and a unit withdrawal from another.  The linearized network model does not represent 
resistance losses or reactive power, but does capture the parallel flow nature of power flows.  Schweppe et al. (1988) 
derive the linearized model (termed, misleadingly, a “DC” load flow model); they also derive the mentioned rela-
tionship between transmission prices and individual constraint prices. 
17
If all profit functions are quadratic or linear in the firm’s decision variables, and all constraints are linear, then the 
f(x) in the complementarity conditions are linear, and the equilibrium problem is termed a linear complementarity 
problem (Cottle et al., 1992). 
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equal number of conditions for each time period simulated. 
Data Assumptions 
Demand, transmission, and generation data are meant to represent year 2000 conditions in 
the study region.   Data sources are documented in Hobbs et al. (2004). 
Demand curves represent net wholesale electricity demands (“loads”) on the high voltage 
grid for six network nodes in the Netherlands, two in Belgium, and one aggregate node each in 
France and Germany.  The French and German loads include net exports to other countries outside 
this region, and Luxembourg is included in Germany.  Further, the Dutch loads include loads 
served by decentralized sources, such as combined heat and power systems, whose capacities are 
included in the model. Four demand periods for each of three seasons (summer, winter, and 
spring/fall) are defined for each node in the network (e.g., Figure 2). The highest load period in 
each season includes the 200 hours with the highest sum of the hourly loads for the four countries.  
The three other periods in each season have equal numbers of hours and represent the rest of the 
seasonal load distribution.   Demand curves are affine.  The intercept and slope of each are defined 
such there is a demand elasticity of –0.2 at the price-quantity pair for the competitive solution. 
 Turning to generation, we model the few largest generation firms in the Netherlands and 
Germany as strategic players (Table 1).   EdF, the dominant player in France (Table 1), is as-
sumed to price at marginal cost within France, but can behave strategically in the other markets, 
including Germany where it owns some generation plant.   This assumption is made because 
EdF’s present prices in France are well below the near-monopolistic levels that the Cournot solu-
tion would yield because of the tight transmission constraints into that country.  It is clear that 
EdF exercises restraint in its home market, perhaps because an obvious exercise of market power 
would invite regulatory interference.  Electrabel is modelled either as a Cournot firm or price-
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taking (similar to EdF) in Belgium, depending on the case considered.  In other countries Elec-
trabel is always assumed to be playing a Cournot game. 
 We define each generating “firm” as owning capacity belonging to its subsidiaries in pro-
portion to the firm’s ownership share, assuming that the firm participates in operating decisions.  
(Other assumptions can be made; Amundsen et al., 2000.)  Capacity not owned by the strategic 
companies is incorporated in the model as a price-taking competitive fringe.   Altogether, 5272 
generating units are considered; for simplicity, units at the same location that have similar costs 
and the same ownership have been combined.   Fuel costs are based upon ECN scenarios, and 
capacity is season-dependent (e.g., depending on streamflow for hydroplants).  Figures 3-6 sum-
marize the generating firm data in the form of marginal cost curves for the winter for each large 
generating firm in each country, summed across all locations within a country.  
  Our simulations assume that the presence of forward contracts or vertical integration does 
not restrain the incentive to exercise market power.   This is not an unreasonable approximation, 
since forward contracts in the Netherlands tend to be relatively short-term, a year or less in dura-
tion.  We therefore assume that market power would be equally exercised in the forward and spot 
markets.
18
 
   Regarding transmission, as mentioned, we consider the limits on flows and transactions re-
sulting from both the high voltage system (using a linearized network model) and path-based con-
straints.  The network representation is based on an aggregation of the Benelux network and 
neighboring French and German lines into 19 nodes (Hobbs et al., 2004).  To better represent con-
straints upon exports from France and Germany, portions of their networks near the Benelux bor-
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In reality, however, there is some vertical integration in the Benelux countries, which would dampen the incentive 
to restrict capacity and raise prices if the utility is obliged to provide power at fixed retail rates (Green, 1999).  Also, 
some models of endogenous forward contract prices indicate that forward market will reduce market power (Allaz 
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ders are also represented, although generation and demand in each of those countries are aggre-
gated to a single node.  Disregarding the internal network of those two countries means that their 
price results are more approximate than the Benelux countries, the focus of this analysis.   
 If network capacity constraints are binding, our full network representation is analogous to 
an assumption that the TSOs run efficient balancing (real-time) markets to clear intracountry con-
gestion.  Boucher and Smeers (2002) point out that, in reality, within-country congestion in the EU 
is run inefficiently.  However, we believe that ours is an acceptable approximation, as network con-
straints rarely bind in our solutions, and the path constraints are more important economically. 
 Data from Haubrich et al. (2001) are used to define the path-based flow limitations; these 
are differentiated by season.  The small arcs that cross the arrows in Figure 7 indicate what con-
straints are considered.  Besides the Dutch interfaces discussed in Section 2, the most important 
constraint limits total exports from France to Belgium and Germany to 3750 MW.   
 Finally, we assume that the presence of a dominant firm and a de facto lack of market ac-
cess in France and Belgium mean that arbitragers only have effective access to the power markets 
in the Netherlands and Germany under the present transmission management system. 
4.  RESULTS 
The sets of results summarized here include (1) a competitive baseline; (2) present trans-
mission pricing system vs market coupling, assuming Electrabel behaves as a Cournot player; and 
(3) present transmission system vs market coupling, assuming Electrabel exercises pricing restraint 
in Belgium because of perceived regulatory threats.  Table 2 summarizes the assumptions regarding 
management of the Dutch interfaces with Belgium and Germany for the competitive baseline, pre-
sent transmission system, and market coupling proposals.  As we stated earlier, the present Belgian-
                                                                                                                                                              
and Vila, 1993).  However, this is disputed by others (Harvey and Hogan, 2000) and experimental evidence is con-
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Dutch situation imposes a cap of 400 MW on any single firm importing to the Netherlands and, 
because of the Belgian market’s opacity, an effective limit of zero into Belgium.  Historical import 
data on the Dutch-Belgian interconnector shows that some imports occur from Netherlands to Bel-
gium
19
. Therefore it is assumed that 200 MW on the interconnector is available for traders (arbitra-
geurs). The remaining import capacity (950 MW) is solely available to Electrabel, since Electrabel 
does have access to its home market in Belgium.  However, we do not restrict any company’s ac-
cess to the French-Belgian interface, because that capacity is allocated by nonmarket mechanisms, 
and is fully used.  Flows on the Dutch interfaces are not presently netted, as discussed.  In contrast, 
the market coupling proposal imposes no limits on individual firm or arbitrager flows (as noted 
earlier, this yields profits and prices equivalent to a system where a TSO or other market operator 
undertakes all intermarket transmission).   Net flows, rather than gross flows in each direction, are 
counted against transmission constraints between Belgium and the Netherlands; however, no-
netting is still imposed in the German-Netherlands interfaces.   
Table 3 summarizes energy price, quantity, and welfare outcomes for the solutions.  The 
welfare results should be interpreted as follows.  “Profit” is the gross margin earned by producers, 
as fixed costs are excluded.  TSO revenues are equal to the price of transmission constraints times 
the flows; these exclude fixed payments made by consumers and producers for use of the grid, 
which we assume do not distort trade.  Consumer surplus is, of course, very sensitive to the elastic-
ity and linearity assumptions; the total consumer surplus matters less than the change in consumer 
surplus between the solutions.   Likewise, because consumer surplus is a component of social sur-
plus (which also includes profit and transmission surplus), differences in social surplus are more 
meaningful than totals.  Therefore, we indicate the change in social surplus relative to the competi-
                                                                                                                                                              
tradictory (Brandts et al., 2003; Le Coq and Orzen, 2002).  
19 Historical import data can be found on the website of Elia, the Belgian TSO; www.elia.be. 
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tive baseline in the last line of the table.   
Competitive vs Cournot Results 
The competitive equilibrium is the leftmost column, and is also shown in Figure 8.
20
    
There, all firms are price takers, and prices equal marginal cost in all markets.   Price differences 
between markets equal the sum of the prices of congested path interfaces between them.  For in-
stance, the Belgian price of 28.4 €/MWh equals the French price of 14.4 plus the prices for the F-B 
constraint (9.5) and the F-B/D constraint (4.5).   Thus, in our model, essentially all congestion costs 
are due to the tight path-based constraints, and not the full network constraints.  These prices are 
roughly 10% above estimated marginal costs in the Netherlands and Germany for 2001 as reported 
in Brattle (2002), although the price differences are similar.   Their estimates may differ from ours 
because different years and fuel prices are used, and the Brattle estimates are not based upon a full 
regional transmission-constrained market model.    
In contrast, average actual market prices in 2001 (24.1 €/MWh in the German EEX and 
34.2 €/MWh in the Dutch APX) are well above our competitive levels, and more closely resemble 
the Cournot results in Table 3 (especially the Cournot solutions under the present transmission pric-
ing system).  Thus, market power does appear to be exercised in these markets.   Our four Cournot 
solutions result in ranges of prices from 29 to 45 €/MWh in Belgium and 29 to 37 €/MWh in the 
Netherlands, the extremes of which are slightly higher to almost double the competitive levels.  
Meanwhile, Cournot prices are 20% higher than competitive prices in Germany, and nearly un-
changed in France.  As would be expected, the ranges of Cournot results are much smaller in 
France and Germany than in the Benelux countries, because the Cournot solutions differ in their 
assumptions about the Benelux market.  Generally, when prices are higher in Belgium and the 
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 The Belgian, Dutch, and French competitive prices are slightly higher than in Hobbs et al. (2004) because of mi-
nor updates to the generation database.  
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Netherlands, they are also slightly higher in Germany because German producers export more 
power.  (French exports are nearly always transmission constrained, so higher Benelux prices gen-
erally do not elicit more exports from that country.) 
Figures 8-10 display the prices for the competitive case and the two “Electrabel Cournot” 
cases.  Figure 9 highlights (in parentheses) how much prices rise compared to the competitive case. 
However, as demand is relatively inelastic, the high price increases resulting from Cournot behav-
ior do not necessarily imply large impacts on aggregate welfare.   The welfare loss in the worst case 
(Electrabel Cournot, Present Transmission) amounts to 0.7 €/MWh, averaged over the load in the 
four country region (or about double that if only averaged over the three countries where market 
power raises prices significantly).  In contrast, the average price increase is 2.5 €/MWh, averaged 
over the four countries (again doubling if averaged only over German, Dutch, and Belgian con-
sumption).  Most of the price increase is simply an income transfer from consumers to producers.  
Cournot gross margins are from one fourth to one third higher than competitive levels.    
The transmission operators also earn more congestion revenue in the Cournot equilibria.  At 
first glance, this is surprising, since lower loads together with the no-netting provisions for some 
interfaces might be expected to translate into lower net quantities transmitted through the inter-
faces. Furthermore, the lack of access to the Belgian market under the present transmission system 
would imply that producers would not be willing to pay for that country’s interface with the Neth-
erlands (as Figure 9 indicates is indeed the case).   However, there are two explanations for the 
higher TSO revenue in the Cournot solutions.  One is that the no-netting provisions mean that con-
gestion revenue can be earned in both directions on an interface.  For instance, during some peri-
ods, the Dutch-German interface in the Cournot solution in Figure 10 is constrained both for im-
ports to and exports from the Netherlands.  This is indicated by the positive prices for both con-
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straints.  This is possible even though German prices are lower than Dutch prices, as a large pro-
ducer in the Netherlands with only a small market share in Germany can have a higher marginal 
revenue in the latter country, and thus be willing to pay to export to that market.  The other expla-
nation for the higher congestion revenue is that when Electrabel behaves à la Cournot, the high 
prices it charges in Belgium induce large congestion revenues on the French-Belgian interconnec-
tor.  (Note the higher prices for the French interface in Figure 9 compared to Figure 8.) 
Electrabel Behavior: Cournot vs Price Taking 
Here we compare the four Cournot solutions of Table 3, focusing on the strategic behavior 
of Electrabel.  The second and third columns of results in Table 3 are Cournot equilibria under the 
assumption that Electrabel behaves in a Cournot manner in all markets.  On the other hand, the 
equilibria in the last two columns instead assume that Electrabel perceives a threat of regulation 
from the Belgian authorities and therefore acts as a price-taker in Belgium (but still Cournot else-
where).   The latter assumption results in lower prices in the Benelux countries; the most dramatic 
effect is in Belgium under the present transmission system, where prices are a full one-third lower 
(mainly because under the present situation of no-netting and essentially no market access for 
Dutch and German producers, Electrabel is nearly a monopolist).   Market coupling mutes this ef-
fect somewhat.  In contrast, a price-taking Electrabel results in Belgian prices in the Cournot solu-
tions that are only one or two € per MWh above competitive levels.  Prices do not fall completely 
to competitive levels there because Cournot prices are higher elsewhere, increasing Electrabel’s 
opportunity cost of selling in its own market instead of in other countries. 
A price-taking Electrabel in Belgium benefits the Netherlands also, most dramatically under 
market coupling.   In the latter case, lower prices in Belgium mean that the opportunity cost for 
Dutch and German producers of selling in the Netherlands is much less, so Dutch prices fall by 
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over 8 €/MWh, on average.  Overall, if Electrabel is a price-taker in Belgium, the deadweight loss 
due to market power is one-half or less than if Electrabel is Cournot everywhere (see the last row of 
Table 3).  Of course, Electrabel’s present pricing behavior in Belgium may presently lie somewhere 
between the price-taking and Cournot extremes, rather than being pure-price taking.  Hence, the 
welfare consequences of lessening the perceived regulatory threat in Electrabel’s home market may 
be less extreme than considered here. 
The Impact of Market-Coupling 
First, we consider the effect of the changes that market coupling would bring to transmis-
sion allocation and pricing procedures (Table 2), assuming that Electrabel is a Cournot player eve-
rywhere.  These effects can be assessed by comparing Figures 9 and 10, and the second and third 
columns of Table 3.  The prices in parentheses in Figure 10 indicate the impact of market coupling 
(the difference between prices in Figures 9 and 10).  These figures indicate that coupling would 
greatly enhance competition within Belgium; the resulting average price there (37 €/MWh) is 
closer to the competitive Belgian price (28 €/MWh) than it is to the present transmission system 
level (45 €/MWh).  The greater market opportunities for Dutch producers result in more exports to 
Belgium.  Congestion turns out to be infrequent for the Belgian-Dutch interconnection and prices 
are nearly equal for those two countries.  Thus, market coupling would eliminate the ability of a 
Cournot Electrabel to price discriminate between Belgium (where in the absence of coupling there 
is little competition and no arbitrager access, thus allowing it to raise prices) and the Netherlands 
(which would be the more competitive market if there is no coupling, so that the residual demand 
curve facing Electrabel would be more elastic and prices would wind up being lower).   
On the other hand, nearly equal prices in the two countries in the presence of Electrabel 
market power would not be a pleasing prospect for Dutch consumers, as their prices under market 
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coupling actually rise by over 4 €/MWh, due to higher exports by Dutch producers.   The higher 
profits by Dutch producers (excluding Electrabel plants in the Netherlands) do not make up for the 
consumer surplus lost by Dutch consumers. 
Market coupling, assuming a Cournot Electrabel everywhere, increases social surplus over 
the present transmission situation by about 200 M€/yr.  This benefit arises from both production 
efficiencies (as cheaper imports substitute for costly Electrabel production), and allocative efficien-
cies (as the incremental Belgian consumption exceeds the cost of providing it).  As just noted, 
though, not everyone benefits.  Although consumer surplus in Belgium increases by approximately 
600 M€/yr, Dutch consumer surplus instead falls—by about half that amount—due to the price rise 
that the solutions indicate they would suffer.  Concern over this possibility has been expressed by 
the Netherlands Market Surveillance Committee (Newbery et al., 2003). 
The conclusions change significantly if instead Electrabel behaves as a price-taker in Bel-
gium.  It is true that market coupling would improve the total consumer surplus in just Belgium and 
the Netherlands by about 300 M€/yr in both the Cournot and price-taking Electrabel cases.  But 
comparing the two price-taking Electrabel solutions (the last two columns of Table 3), we see that 
the benefits of market coupling are now equally shared by Belgian and Dutch consumers, as prices 
fall by nearly the same amount in each country.
21
  Yet the aggregate increase in social surplus due 
to market coupling (53 M€/yr = 282-229) is only a quarter of that projected if instead Electrabel 
behaves strategically (Cournot) in Belgium.   
Thus, the behavior of Electrabel in its main market is key to both the total benefits of mar-
ket coupling and their distribution.  As a worst case for market coupling, we could compare the 
fourth column with the third in Table 3: the present transmission situation with a price-taking Elec-
                                                 
21
 Although average prices are about the same in the two countries, they do differ from period to period, resulting in 
their shared interconnector being constrained in different directions at different times. 
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trabel, with market coupling assuming that Electrabel is Cournot throughout.   This would be the 
appropriate comparison if it was believed that Electrabel now prices in a very restrained manner, 
but would feel free of any potential regulatory restraint if the markets were coupled.  Electrabel 
might feel that way because it would not appear to be a monopolist in the coupled market.  How-
ever, Electrabel would control fully half of the capacity in the combined Belgian-Dutch market 
(Table 1), and its resulting market power would only be partially mitigated by imports from France 
and Germany.   The consequence, as a comparison of those two columns shows, would be that 
market coupling, together with Electrabel flexing its market power, cause prices to increase by 
about 6 €/MWh in both the Netherlands and Belgium, compared to the present transmission system 
under a price-taking Electrabel.  Another consequence is that deadweight loss would double, from 
282 M€/yr to 550 M€/yr.   
These conclusions about the impacts of market coupling can be compared to other studies.   
Petrov et al. (2003) used a supply function equilibrium approach to simulate a coupled Benelux 
market, and concluded that prices would decrease.  However, that analysis did not explicitly repre-
sent transmission constraints or separate Dutch and Belgian spot markets, nor were the German and 
French markets considered.   In another study, Neuhoff (2003a) considered the present transmission 
situation in the Benelux region using a Cournot model (Neuhoff, 2003b) that simulates a game with 
the following structure: traders buy physical transmission rights between countries, which commits 
them to buy energy in the spot markets, while generators sell energy in their home spot markets, 
recognizing only the local elasticity.   In contrast, he assumes a Stackelberg structure under market 
coupling, in which generators bid into a pool, anticipating how the pool will price transmission 
(i.e., by including the TSO’s first-order conditions in the generators’ constraint sets, similar to, e.g., 
Cardell et al., 1997).  He finds that if all producers are Cournot (including Electrabel, which he 
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represents as a local monopolist in Belgium), consumers in all countries are better off under market 
coupling, in contrast to our conclusion that Dutch consumers could be worse off.  However, Neu-
hoff’s analysis differs from ours in two important respects.  First, the two-stage structure of his 
present system model assumes that generators only consider the elasticity in their home markets; in 
our model (and in reality), generators can sell elsewhere (e.g., Dutch generators to Germany), and 
the effective demand they face can be more elastic, yielding lower prices.  Second, the Neuhoff 
analysis does not consider all the effects of market coupling considered here, especially the effect 
of eliminating the “no-netting” policy.  He assumes that flows are netted both in the present system 
and under coupling.   In general, differences in the treatment of transmission allocation and pricing 
models can make a significant difference in the conclusions of different models, even if they all are 
Cournot in energy sales (Neuhoff et al., 2004).  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Coupling the Belgian-Dutch electricity markets would increase electricity trade by enhanc-
ing access to the Belgian market, eliminating “no-netting” provisions for electricity flow, and fa-
cilitating arbitrage by eliminating the mismatch in timing between daily transmission interface 
markets and spot energy markets.   A priori, one would expect that increases in economic effi-
ciency would follow from implementation those reforms.   As measured by aggregate social sur-
plus, the transmission-constrained oligopoly analysis of this paper supports this expectation, as long 
as Electrabel’s behavior (price-taking or Cournot) does not change when market coupling is im-
plemented.   However, the magnitude of increases in efficiency and their distribution depend 
strongly on the amount of market power.   In particular, there is uncertainty over how much market 
power the largest player in the Benelux countries (Electrabel) now exercises in Belgium and how 
that might change if the markets are coupled.   If Electrabel plays a Cournot game in Belgium, our 
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simulation under year 2000 conditions indicates that the market coupling would enhance social 
surplus for Northwest Europe by a large amount (about 200 M€/yr), but would hurt Dutch consum-
ers by raising their prices.   But if Electrabel is and continues to be a price-taker in Belgium, gains 
in social surplus would be more modest (about 50 M€/yr) but would be shared more evenly, with 
Belgian and Dutch consumers benefiting equally.   
But market coupling could actually decrease social surplus in the extreme case in which 
Electrabel acts as a price-taker in Belgium under the present transmission system (perhaps due to 
an unstated but perceived threat of regulatory intervention) but feels free to switch to a Cournot 
strategy under market coupling.  The deadweight loss due to oligopoly in Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Germany, and France almost doubles if market coupling enables Electrabel, which controls 
half of the Benelux generation capacity, to start to fully exercise its market power in generation. 
Therefore, we agree with Newbery et al. (2003) that it is important for the Dutch and Bel-
gian regulators to monitor market developments closely, and to be prepared to implement market 
power mitigation measures.  There are several possible types of measures.  One consists of struc-
tural changes to the generation market, including requiring that the largest generation firm(s) divest 
assets or auction off the rights to the gross margin from their outputs (“virtual power plants”, 
VPPs).   VPPs have been imposed previously in the Netherlands as a condition upon a proposed 
vertical merger, and divestment was an important tool of the UK regulator.   As we noted supra, 
Harris et al. (2003) has proposed that Electrabel be required to divest assets as a precondition for 
coupling the markets.
22
  Another mitigation approach is to place regulatory constraints on price 
offers, such as requiring marginal cost bidding into spot markets by the largest producer.   This is 
the approach to be implemented in the Irish market.  A variant is the “automated bid mitigation” 
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(AMP) that is used in several US markets.
23
  
Investigations of these and other possible mitigation measures are underway.
24
  The simula-
tions presented here show that much could be at stake.  In particular, if the largest generating firm 
in the Benelux region feels free to price strategically as a result of market coupling, then the poten-
tial production and allocative efficiency benefits of market coupling could be lost. 
We note several limitations of this analysis.   One is that there are many alternative formu-
lations of transmission-constrained electricity oligopoly games.  Other formulations, such as the 
two-stage model of Neuhoff (2003b) or supply function equilibria could (and do) yield different 
conclusions.  For instance, it might be argued that because of its size, Electrabel should be viewed 
as a Stackelberg leader in the Benelux market, correctly anticipating how transmission prices and 
competitors’ outputs would change in response to its actions (Harris et al., 2003).  Analyses could 
also be done assuming implementation of market power mitigation, such as divestment or bid caps.  
Also, the effects of different degrees of long-term forward contracting or financial transmission 
rights could be assessed (Green, 1999; Joskow and Tirole, 2000).  We believe that there is no single 
“correct” model, and no model should be used for precise prediction of prices; rather, such models 
should be used to suggest possible outcomes of market changes.      
Another limitation is that we disregard the inefficiencies of the present transmission system 
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 Bower (2004) argues that such divestment is a much more cost-effective means of enhancing competition in Euro-
pean markets than building transmission lines.  However, coupling of the Belgian-Dutch markets does not involve 
transmission construction. 
23
  There, whether or not bids are mitigated is determined day-by-day, the argument being that a market that is com-
petitive today might not be so tomorrow because of changes in load or availability of transmission or generation.   
AMP consists of a pair of tests.  The conduct test flags a bid as a candidate for mitigation if it is more than a given 
multiple either of estimated marginal costs or previous bids made under more competitive conditions.  Then if the 
bid also fails an impact test, it is mitigated to a “reference level”, consisting either of a multiple of marginal cost or 
previous bids.  The impact test then consists of assessing whether mitigating bids that fail the conduct test would 
result in price decreases anywhere that exceed a specified threshold. 
24
  The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs recently requested that the Dutch regulator investigate the auctioning of 
VPPs as a way to mitigate market power.  See the letter by the Minister to the Parliament on 23 April 2004 
(ME/EM/4028011) as a response to the market liquidity study performed by DTe 
(www.dte.nl/en/Images/13_20107.pdf). 
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that are caused by mismatches between the timing of day-ahead transmission and electricity mar-
kets.  Consideration of sequentially settled markets with imperfect arbitrage is much more difficult, 
but could indicate that market coupling has significantly more benefits than indicated here.  A third 
limitation is the short-run nature of our analysis.  Only short-run operating decisions in the year 
2000 have been simulated.  A more complete analysis would encompass a decade or longer, and 
would consider the effect of market coupling on the location, timing, and type of generation enter-
ing the market.  In the long run, market coupling could bring additional efficiencies by lowering the 
amount of installed generation capacity that is needed to ensure system reliability.
25
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Table 1.  Ownership Distribution for Generation Capacity in Study Region 
    
Total  
generation 
National 
 market  
Market share 
in 
Country Firms 
capacity 
[MWe] 
capacity 
share 
the four 
countries 
Belgium Electrabel SA 12587 83% 6% 
France Comp Nationale Du Rhone 3068 3% 1% 
  Electricite de France 102089 90% 38% 
Germany Berliner Kraft und Licht AG 1096 1% 0% 
  E.ON Energie AG 28743 24% 11% 
  
ENBW Energie-Versorgung 
Schwaben 9360 8% 4% 
  
Hamburgische Elec-werke 
AG 4150 3% 2% 
  
Neckarwerke Suttgart AG 
(NWS) 2181 2% 1% 
  RWE Energie AG 25625 21% 10% 
  STEAG AG 4302 4% 2% 
  Vattenfal Europe AG 11688 10% 4% 
Netherlands E.ON Energie AG 1813 10% -- 
  Electrabel SA 4563 26% -- 
  Essent Energy Production BV 3305 18% 1% 
  Nuon (Reliant) 3578 20% 1% 
   218147  82% 
 
 
Table 2.   Comparison of Transmission and Market Access Assumptions 
Import cap on firms Import cap on arbitrageurs  
 
Cases 
B  NL B←NL 
B ←NL  
Electrabel  B  NL B ←NL G ↔NL 
 
Flow 
Netting 
 
Competitive (Effi-
cient) Case 
No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit Yes 
 
Current B-
NL situation 
400
a 
 
0 
 
950 0 200 No limit No 
 
C 
O 
U 
R 
N 
O 
T 
 
Market Cou-
pling 
Proposal 
None* None* None* No limit No limit No limit 
B ↔ 
NL 
a.  No restrictions are assumed on the French-Belgian interface, which is usually fully used.
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Table 3.  Price, Quantity, and Welfare Results under Alternative Cases 
  
 
Electrabel Cournot 
Electrabel Price-Taking 
in Belgium 
  
Competitive 
Baseline 
Present 
Transmission 
Market 
Coupling 
Present 
Transmission 
Market 
Coupling 
Mean Market Prices by Country [Euro/MWh]
a 
  
Belgium 28.36 45.01 36.69 30.72 29.27 
France 14.40 14.15 14.25 14.32 14.32 
Germany  18.86 22.41 22.06 22.39 22.40 
Netherlands 27.34 32.87 37.08 31.54 28.94 
Mean Sales by Country[MW]
b     
Belgium 9539 7263 8396 9211 9401 
France 54119 54408 54282 54215 54216 
Germany  53061 48875 49276 48887 48878 
Netherlands 8510 7807 7288 7972 8303 
Annual Welfare Measures [M€/yr]   
Generation cost 12993 12072 12206 12072 12206 
Consumer surplus 26139 22974 23371 23965 24315 
Generator profit 6820 8914 8721 8609 8363 
TSO congestion 
  revenue 470 796 787 574 523 
Social surplus 33430 32684 32879 33147 33201 
Loss of social  
  surplus compared 
  to baseline 0 -746 -550 -282 -229 
a. Calculated by weighting each period and node’s price by the total MWh demanded at that price 
b. Calculated by weighting each period’s quantity by the number of hours in the period. 
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Figure 1.   Schematic of Generator-Consumer-TSO Relationships in COMPETES   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.   Electricity Demanded (Under Perfect Competition) in the Netherlands (Sum over 
Six Nodes) 
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Figure 3.  Marginal Cost Curves for German Producers, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Marginal Cost Curves for French Producers, 2000 
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Figure 5.  Marginal Cost Curves for Belgian Producers, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Marginal Cost Curves for Dutch Producers, 2000 
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Figure 7.   Path-Based Transmission System and Constrained Interfaces (Includes Constraints 
on Total Imports to Netherlands and Total Exports from France) 
 
Figure 8.    Perfect Competition Solution (Prices in Boxes are Quantity-Weighted Averages of 
Energy prices; Italicized Prices are Quantity-Weighted Averages of Interface Prices) 
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Figure 9.    Cournot Solution, Present Transmission Institutions (Prices in Boxes are Quantity-
Weighted Averages of Energy prices, with Changes Compared to Perfect Competition in Parenthe-
ses; Italicized Prices are Quantity-Weighted Averages of Interface Prices) 
   Note: EdF assumed to be price-taking within France, Electrabel assumed to behave à la Cournot 
 
 
Figure 10.   Cournot Solution, Market Coupling Case (Prices in Boxes are Quantity-Weighted Av-
erages of Energy prices, with Changes Compared to Cournot/Present Transmission Institutions 
inParentheses; Italicized Prices are Quantity-Weighted Averages of Interface Prices) 
   Note: EdF assumed to be price-taking within France, Electrabel assumed to behave à la Cournot 
